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IN THE S·UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARCHIE POULSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
C. V. niANNESS, doing business as 
Manness Construction & Appliance 
Company, and UDELL WOOD, 
Defendants and .Appellmnts. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 7 6'63 
The record was prepared with the transcript of 
testimony beginning on page 16. References to the trans-
script are designated "Tr." References to the record 
other than the transcript are designated ''R. '' 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, hereinafter called plaintiff, brought 
this action against the appellants, C. V. Manness, 
doing business as Manness Construction & Appliance 
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Company, and Udell Woods, hereinafter referred to 
as defendants, for damages and injuries resulting from 
an intersection collision between the jeep plaintiff was 
driving and the automobile driven by the defendant, 
Udell Wood, while said Wood was in the employ of the 
defendant, Manness. The case was tried before a jury. 
After the opening statement by counsel for the plain-
tiff, defendant moved the court for a directed verdict 
based upon counsel's opening ~tatement and the an-
swers to written interrogatories of the plaintiff on file 
and of record. The court denied this motion. After 
the close of plaintiff's case, the trial court denied de-
fendants' motion for a nonsuit, and after both parties 
had introduced their evidence and rested, the trial 
court denied defendants' motion for a directed verdict. 
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and against 
the defendants. Thereafter, the trial court denied de-
fendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and defendants' motion for a new trial. It is 
from this verdict, the judgment which was entered, and 
the trial court's rulings that defendants appeal. 
Mr. Archie Poulsen, the plaintiff, was a farmer, 
mechanic and heavy machine operator, 46 years of 
age, living in Sugarville, Utah. On August 4, 1949, he 
had gone to the neighboring town of Delta to get some 
repairs for machinery he had been working on. (Tr. 
12-13) He left Delta at 11:00 or 11:15 o'clock A.M., 
driving his jeep and accompanied by his wife, Norma 
Poulsen, who was sitting on the right in the front seat, 
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and his sn1all son, J a1nes, sitting 1n the middle of the 
front seat between then1. The jeep was painted green 
and had a brown top. (Tr. 63) He drove northwest 
of Delta about half a mile and then on the Abraham 
road to the Sugarville-Hinckley road and north on 
that road to its intersection with the Topaz highway, 
at which intersection the accident occurred. (Tr. 14) 
The Sugarville-Hinckley road is a graveled surface 
road, running north and south, and is approximately 
24 feet wide. The Topaz highway is a hard surfaced 
or oiled road running east and west, the oiled surface 
being 20 feet wide with a 2 foot graveled shoulder on 
each side thereof. (Tr. 21-22) At the time of the ac~ 
cident there was a wooden bridge on the Sugarville-
Hinckley road just south of the intersection in ques-
tion and sunflowers and weeds ·6 to 7¥2 feet tall grew 
on the shoulders of the highway. (Tr. 15, 62, 125, 152, 
153) 
The defendant, Udell Wood, left Delta the same 
morning driving an automobile owned by the defendant, 
Manness. He was accompanied by one Bud Barker, and 
they were going to Abraham, located on the Topaz 
highway about ¥2 mile west of the scene of the accident. 
(Tr. 158) Wood turned west onto the Topaz highway, 
and proceeded about 100 feet before the road became 
rough, quite badly marked and badly cut up, which 
condition existed until some 1,500 feet to nearly % 
mile east of the intersection in question, (Tr. 67, 129, 
158-9) over which portion of the road Wood drove at 
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a speed of about 10 miles per hour. From where this 
bad part of the road ends to the intersection the road 
is straight, bordered by sunflowers and weeds, and 
Wood accelerated until he reached a speed he testified 
as being 50 miles per hour (Tr. 159, 193) and which 
the plaintiff estimated to be around 70 miles per hour. 
(Tr. 16-18) The defendant, Wood, did not see plain-
tiff's jeep until he was just about 40 feet from it (Tr. 
160) at which time he put on his brakes and left skid 
marks on the oiled surface from 22 to 30 feet long to 
the point of impact. (Tr. 124, 129-30, 175) 
When Mr. Poulsen approached the intersection 
from the south, he brought his jeep to a stop with the 
front wheels 3 feet back from the south line of the 
Topaz highway. He then looked to the east and the 
west, put his jeep in gear and started forward until 
he could see farther west, and when he was about in 
the center of the Topaz road, he turned and looked 
east and saw the defendants' automobile about 30 or 
40 feet away from him. (Tr. 15, 22) Mr. Poulsen had 
reached the speed of about 10 miles per hour when the 
collision occurred. The front of the defendants' auto-
mobile struck the front center of the jeep at a point 
in the intersection which could be designated as just 
slightly north of the center of the intersection. After 
the accident, the jeep came to rest on its side heading 
north from 35 to 45 feet northwest of the point of the 
impact, and the automobile of defendant came to rest 
he'ading east from 25 to 30 feet west of the point of 
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impact. ~lr. and ~Irs. Poulsen were on the ground and 
in or by a ditch just west and north of the jeep. ( T r. 
18, 19, 51, 113, 123-4, 164) 
ST~-\.TE:JIENT OF POINTS 
1. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY 
THE SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE ISSUE OF THE 
NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
2. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF, ARCHIE POULSEN, WAS GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANTS' FIRST MOTION FOR A DI-
RECTED VERDICT. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NON-SUIT. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR A DI-
RECTED VERDICT. 
6. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT. 
7. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE 
SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE ISSUE OF 
NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS 
Mr. Wood had only been on the Topaz highway 
once before. Shortly after he turned onto the high-
way, he encountered a badly cut up surface and drove 
at a speed of about 10 miles per hour until he was some 
1,500 feet from the intersection where the accident oc-
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curred. The highway was lined with a thick growth 
of sunflowers and weeds some 7-¥2 feet tall, and there 
was nothing to indicate the existance of the inter-
section in question as he approached it. Any observa-
tion to the south and west of the highway would fail 
to disclose plaintiff's jeep approaching for an embank-
ment and weeds were along the east side of the Sugar-
ville-Hinckley road traveled by the plaintiff. The 
highway was straight and flat and had an oiled mac-
adam surface indicative of a highway and not a side 
road. It was not unusual or peculiar that the defend-
ant, Wood, failed to see the plaintiff's jeep until it 
was in the middle of the intersection, for the jeep was 
green, like the weeds, and had proceeded some 13 feet 
to the center of the intersection from a hidden position 
in a maximum time of some 2 seconds as will be here-
inafter illustrated. Defendant, Wood, testified that he 
looked at his speedometer and then back at the road 
and then saw the jeep for the first time. There can 
be no negligence imputed to defendant, Wood, for his 
failure to avoid plaintiff's jeep after seeing it in the 
middle of the road for any application of the last clear 
chance doctrine would have to be predicated upon the 
ability of defendant, Wood, to avoid the collision after 
he saw plaintiff's jeep, and the record entirely nega-
tives such a possibility. H'ickok v. Skinner, ____ Utah ____ , 
190 P. 2d 514; Gren v. Norton, ____ Utah ____ , 213 P. 2d 356. 
Nor is there any evidence of the f•ailure of the defendants 
to have the automobile under proper control. In fact, the 
application of brakes and resulting skid marks are the 
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only affirn1ati.ve evidence that he did have the car under 
innnediate and proper control. Nor is there any evi-
dence of failure by defendant to yield the right of way, 
for defendant was approaching from the plaintiff's 
right, and even though plaintiff entered the intersec-
tion first, the right of way did not become his when de-
fendant was so close as to constitute an immediate 
hazard. Gren v. Norton, supra.; Hickok v. Skinner, 
supra.; Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350. In 
the Gren v. Norton case, supra, at page 358, this court 
re-affirmed the following rule : 
''The rule we announced was that while 
plaintiff had the right-of-way over defendant 
when he started into the intersection he was 
not permitted, after observing defendant's ap-
proaching automobile, to ignore it completely 
thereafter. '' 
The only alleged negligence on the part of defen-
dant, Wood, was a purported 70 mile per hour speed. 
It is submitted that the only affirmative evidence in 
the case is that defendant, Wood, had reached a speed 
of 50 miles per hour just before the accident, as he 
testified: 
'' Q. As I understand your testimony there 
is some bad spot in the road. 
''A. Well, it is very rough. 
''Q. Very rough? 
''A. No surface. 
'' Q. Do I understand that is 1500 feet 7 
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''A. Up to 1500 feet before the accident. 
"Q. I see. Now, would you please tell the 
court and jury what the condition of the road 
was after you left this rough spot~ 
''A. Yes sir. It was a hard surface road, 
slightly pocked, not anything to be rough or 
hinder driving. 
'' Q. Were there sunflowers or weeds along 
the side~ 
''A. A great deal of them, very thick and 
very tall. 
"Q. At what speed were you traveling 
along that road after you left the rough part?' 
"A. After-as soon as I left the rough 
spot I was traveling at the rate of ten miles an 
hour. I accelerated the motor and picked up the 
speed to fifty before the :accident. 
'' Q. You were up to fifty before the ac-
cident~ 
"A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. When did you fiirst see the jeep of 
the plaintiff~ 
"A. I did just before I hit it. 
"Q. Just before you hit it~ 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. Now, when you say just before, do 
you have any idea about how far away it was¥ 
"A. I should say approximately forty feet. 
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'' Q. Around forty feet' 
"A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. And how fast were you going at the 
time you saw the jeep~ 
''A. Fifty miles an hour. 
'' Q. Why do you say fifty miles an hour~ 
Do you knowt 
''A. I do know, because I looked down at 
the speedometer and glanced right up and the 
minute I glanced up, there was the jeep and 
immediately applied my brakes as fast as 
thought would allow me and slid my brakes 
into the jeep. 
'' Q. You did put your brakes on~ 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Did all four tires catch hold, if you 
know~ 
''A. I do know they did, sir. 
'' Q. Did you turn to the right or the left? 
"A. No sir. 
''Q. Why not? 
''A. I had no thought of turning, just to 
stop. The only spot I could see was directly in 
front of me. I seen no intersection to turn on.'' 
(Tr. 158-160) 
Here is no guess or estimate in just a flash. Ex-
amine the testimony of the plaintiff in that regard: 
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'' Q. About how fast was the Oldsmobile 
being driven¥ If you know¥ 
"MR. AADNESEN: Just a minute, I ob-
ject to that, there is nothing here to indicate 
he knew. 
''THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
"Q. Did you have occasion to observe the 
speed of the Oldsmobile as it came toward you 
on the highway¥ 
''A. No, I wouldn't have any way of know-
ing how fast he was coming, only he was coming 
awful fast. 
''MR. AADNESEN: I object to that last 
portion as a conclusion of this witness. 
"THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
"Q. Have you driven automobiles for very 
long, Mr. Poulsen 1 
''A. Oh, I have driven automobiles I guess 
for around-! am forty-six, and I started driving 
when I was sixteen. I guess I have driven auto-
mobiles for thirty years. 
'' Q. Are you accustomed to observing the 
speed of automobiles¥ 
''A. Other than my own, you mean¥ 
"Q. Would you have any idea of the speed 
of an automobile if you were to observe it moving 
on the highway 1 
''A. Well, possibly would if the automobile 
was traveling sideways from me. When one is 
coming directly towards you it is hard to esti-
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mate the exact speed, the only thing you could 
tell would be the approximate speed. 
"Q. Could you tell me the approximate 
speed of this car, Mr. Poulsen~ 
'' ~IR. AAD~ESEN: He said he didn't ob-
serve it only for a split second; there is noth-
ing here to qualify this witness. May I refer 
to the record where he stated he couldn't tell~ 
''MR. ELIASON: I asked the speed 
of the car. 
"MR. AADNESEN: Let's have the record 
read. 
(Part of record read.) 
''THE COURT: He may answer yes or 
no to the question. 
"A. How is that~ 
"THE COURT: You may answer yes or 
no to that. 
(Last question read) 
"A. Yes, I could tell you the approximate 
speed. 
''Q. What was the 'approximate speed~ 
"MR. AADNESEN: I object to it on the 
same basis, your Honor, the record specifically 
shows he has no knowledge of what it is, based 
on speculation. 
''MR. ELIASON: Based on observation. 
''THE COURT: He may answer. 
''MR. AADNESEN: There is another ques-
tion back there-
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''THE COURT: The way the court remem-
bers it, where he asked with reference to speed, 
he says he couldn't observe it long enough. 
"MR. AADNESEN: That is perfectly all 
right, at least the record is clear. 
"Q. Would you state the approximate 
speed~ 
"THE COURT: Just a moment. 
"MR. ELIASON: I didn't know that there 
was an objection. 
''THE COURT: Read the other question 
he gave a few minutes ago. 
(Part of record read as follows: 'Q. 
Did you have occasion to observe the speed of 
the Oldsmobile as it came toward you on the 
highway~') 
"THE COURT: He may answer the pend-
ing question. Do you remember the question~ 
''A. How is that~ 
"THE COURT: Do you remember the 
question~ 
''A. The last question he asked me, how fast. 
I would say-
"MR. AADNESEN: Just a moment. 
(Last question read) 
"A. I would say that he was making 
seventy miles an hour or better." (Tr. 16-18) 
It is apparent from this testimony that Mr. Poul-
sen's estimate of speed was a mere speculation or 
guess and constituted no affirmative evidence. The 
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only other instance where 70 miles per hour is even 
mentioned is in the recital of the purported conver-
sation with defendant, \Yood. The attention of this 
court is respectfully called to the fact that three other 
witnesses indulged in or heard the purported con-
versation, and yet only one witness is supposed to 
have heard an admission that defendant, Wood, was 
going 70 miles per hour. The importance of this is 
well indicated by the cross-examination in that par-
ticular: 
"Q. You have been sitting here while the 
other young gentlemen testified, Mr. Gardner 
and :\lr. Poulsen ' 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. You alone apparently recall something 
about speed. 
''A. That is right. 
'' Q. Do you have any reason for that~ 
''A. Because at the time of the accident 
I heard about it and I was wondering how 
come---:how fast he would have to go to knock 
a jeep just as far as he did. 
'' Q. Just a moment, I asked you a ques-
tion about a conversation. 
''A. I understood. 
'' Q. My question goes to why did you 
hear it and the others not. 
''A. I don't know that they didn't. 
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"Q. You don't know that they didn't. 
They didn't so testify, you have sat here, 
haven't you~ 
"A. Yes sir." 
• • :11: 
'' Q. Now, you heard these other boys tes-
tify. Wasn't their testimony as you heard it 
that they were standing and not sitting in the carY 
"A. Mr. Wood and Mr. Gardner was stand-
ing outside the car. Donald Poulsen and Clara 
Jeffrey and myself was sitting in the car. 
"Q. Where was Mr. Poulsen? 
"A. He was setting [sic] on the side op-
posite from the driver's side. 
'' Q. Opposite from the driver. Where was 
Mr. Wood standing~ 
''A. He was standing at the door next to 
where Don was sitting. 
"Q. Where were you sitting? 
''A. I was under the driver's seat. 
'' Q. And so you were clear over under 
the driver's seat~ 
"A. That is right." (Tr. 104-105) 
The apparent value of this testimony can be 
ascertained from the remarks of the trial court to 
the effect that defendant was driving approximately 
50 miles per hour. (Tr. 193) It is further noted 
that no evidence appears in the record as to any 
speed limit on the Topaz highway nor was any such 
presented to the jury. To predicate the negligence of 
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the defendant on such a slim possibility when the only 
affinnatiYe evidence i~ otherwise is to allow the jury to 
indulge in vagaries and speculations. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PLAINTIFF, 
ARCHIE POULSEN, WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Just before the accident, the plaintiff drove his 
green jeep north on the Sugarville-Hinckley road. As 
he approached the intersection where the accident oc-
curred, his vie\\T to the northeast ·was obstructed by a 
rather high embankment of soil piled by the east 
side of the road, apparently placed there as a result 
of an excavation for a drainage ditch. A dense 
growth of sunflowers and weeds lined the sides of 
this road and the Topaz highway and grew to a 
heighth of some 7lf2 feet. There was no stop sign 
on the south side of the Topaz highway at the inter-
section controlling plaintiff's travel across the Topaz 
highway, although there had been one there previously. 
Plaintiff stopped his jeep before entering the inter-
section because he was fully aware of the dangers 
attendant thereto and he testified to them as follows: 
'' Q. As you approached this intersection 
of th~" Topaz road tell the court and the jury 
what, if anything, you did. 
''A. Well, we drove up to the road and 
stopped, I would estimate, about three feet 
from the oil. 
'' Q. Just a moment. Why did you stop 
there~ 
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''A. Well, there was quite a lot of weeds 
on the road, my vision wasn't too clear. I knew 
they were hauling ore from out at the mine, 
those trucks go through there quite fast. I 
was quite cautious as I go across the road. 
I pulled up and stopped and looked east as 
far as I could, I would say some 400 feet, and 
I looked to the west, I couldn't see so far. I 
put the jeep in gear and started westward 
until I could see west. I could see west and 
there was no traffic from the west, and I turned 
and looked over the other way and I saw this 
Oldsmobile right on top of me. 
'' Q. How far from you~ 
''A. Forty or fifty feet, and of course in 
just a second there was a crash. 
"Q. Just a moment, Mr. Poulsen. Where 
were you in relation to this Topaz road at the 
time that you first saw this Oldsmobile? 
''A. I would say I was about in the center 
of the road when I first saw it. 
"Q. Then it was just before you reached 
the center of the road that you looked west. 
''A. Yes, that is right. 
'' Q. Then you looked again east, IS that 
right~ 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. What portion of the road was this 
Oldsmobile traveling on Y 
''A. He was on his side of the road, right-
hand side, north side." (Tr. 15-16) 
* * * 
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· 'Q. C shows a picture of the road upon 
which you came t 
''A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Prior to entering the intersection. 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. If you look in the background you 
see some dirt piled there, a drainage ditch. 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. Creates quite a high embankment. 
''A. I would say about four foot bank, 
four and a half. 
''Q. Four and a half foot bank. 
''A. That is right. 
'' Q. Could you see the car or automobile 
of this defendant coming along the Topaz high-
way from a point farther! 
''A. This bank! 
''Q. Yes. 
''A. Yes, because there isn't a solid bank, 
his machine cut along and dumped the piles 
over the bank here, at the bottom between the 
piles, one was four feet high, so you can see 
through the bank some parts along there. 
'' Q. Did you look through the bank~ 
''A. No, the bank was way back from 
the road, no occasion for me to look through 
the bank. 
''MR. ELIASON: How far back is this 
bank from the Topaz road! 
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''A. 185 feet, the road back to the start-
Ing point of the bank. 
'' Q. Between the bank and the main road 
there were weeds~ 
''A. You can see the weeds. 
'' Q. The sunflowers then were cut out~ 
''A. A few, he has made one swath around, 
the large weeds are still growing. 
"Q. Now, in Exhibit E, this bank and 
cut we are talking about is still there. 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. That is the one we are talking about. 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. Out from the Topaz road looking 
south and west you see the embankment. 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. You see the fence with weeds along 
there~ 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. Here is the ditch. 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. Then, is that the ditch that runs 
under the bridge the road went over~ 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. These weeds, they have been cut down 
on the side~ 
"A. Yes." (Tr. 48-49) 
* • * 
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• • Q. The highest parts of the weeds would 
they be approximately how high~ 
"A. Approximately six feet. 
"'Q. Quite dense, weren't they~ 
'' .... \. I don't remember that. 
· · Q. Do you know how tall your jeep wast 
• · 4\. :My jeep would be, I would say, about 
five and a half feet to the top. 
"Q. Five and a half feet~ 
''A. Five and a half feet. 
"Q. You were sitting down~ 
"A. Yes." (Tr. 62) 
* * * 
'' Q. There were weeds on the corner~ 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. You were against those weeds looking 
to the east and to the west down the topaz 
highway, and your jeep was against the weeds 
for a considerable time then as you proceeded~ 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. Both the same color. 
''A. The top of the jeep isn't green, the 
top was brown." (Tr. 63) 
* * * 
'' Q. I understand you to say you knew 
that there had been some ore hauling, or ore 
trucks going on that road' 
''A. That is right. 
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'' Q. That is both to the east and the west, 
isn't it¥ 
''A. That is right, loaded ones going east. 
'' Q. The unloade9. ones going west 1 
"A. That is right." (Tr. 65) 
* * * 
'' Q. Had you been over the Topaz road 
yourself in the period of time shortly before 
the accident, say a week or so~ 
"A. Had I been over it~ Yes, I have been 
out that way quite a lot of times. 
"Q. You are acquainted with the road 
quite welU 
"A. Yes." (Tr. 66-67) 
Mr. 0. J. Bennett, Deputy Sheriff of Millard County, 
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff and 
testified as follows: 
'' Q. Which roadways were those weeds and 
sunflowers in~ 
''A. Oh, they were on the Topaz road, also 
on the Sugarville road, Sugarville-Deseret, or 
whatever they call it. 
'' Q. Would you have any idea as to about 
the height of those weeds 1 Of course they 
would vary. 
''A. I think I measured one out there from 
the root to the top; I think it was seven and a 
half feet.'' ( Tr. 125) 
It is noted that in spite of all of this recognition 
of the danger, plaintiff did not see defendants' car 
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defendant~' car wa8 40 or 50 feet from him and on 
the right-hand side of the highway where be belonged. 
As further evidence of these conditions, we refer the 
court to Exhibits "A", "C", "E", "F", and "G". 
Further testimony of the plaintiff illustrates the 
position he found himself in when he stopped at the 
intersection : 
"Q. ~lr. Poulsen, just one or two more 
questions. Thly recollection of your testimony 
now, to reflect a little, you said the front wheels 
of your jeep were back about two or three feet 
from the oiled portion of the highway. 
''A. That is right. 
"Q. And in that position you could see 
something like 400 feet to the east. 
''A. That is right. 
"Q. Now, do you have any idea how far 
back from the front wheels you were sitting~ 
''A. Well, the jeep is pretty short. I would 
say 'about three feet, three and a half. 
'' Q. That would put you approximately 
six feet then back from the oiled portion~ 
"A. About that, yes. 
'' Q. Now, your testimony has been, hasn't 
it, that the shoulder of the Topaz road was 
two, two and a half feet-
'' A. About two and a half feet, yes. 
'' Q. And the sunflowers grew right on that 
shoulder, didn't they~ 
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''A. Well now, there was about two and 
a half feet, they grew up to this shoulder. 
"Q. Grew up to the shoulder, about two 
and a half feet from the edge of the shoulder. 
"A. That's right, two and a half feet. 
'' Q. So you were some-let's say, two or 
two and a half feet, and you were six feet back 
so you were some three to four feet back, three 
and a half to four feet back from the edge of 
the sunflowers, weren't you 7 
''A. That's right. 
'' Q. And yet you could see 400 feet up 
the road. 
''A. That is right. 
'' Q. I hand you Exhibit B, you identify, 
do you not, the shoulder of the road, about two 
feet~ 
"A. That is right. 
'' Q. And the weeds grew right to that 
shoulder~ 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. So that you were stopped with the 
front of your wheels behind that shoulder of the 
road, the shoulder line. 
"A. That is right. 
'' Q. And you were three and a half to 
four feet back of that yourself~ 
''A. That's right. 
'' Q. Just so we understand it. And you 
could see 400 feet to the east. 
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··A. That is right. 
•'Q. Now, you never at any time, did you, 
look to the east again until just a fraction of 
a second before the in1pact ~ 
"A. That's right. 
'' Q. And that in spite of the fact that you 
knew that heavy ore trucks were passing on 
that road. 
"A. That's right. They were. 
'' Q. When they were going west on that 
road are you acquainted with whether they 
were filled or unfilled 1 
"A. I am acquainted with they were un-
filled, they were empty trucks going west. 
'' Q. It is a little down hill1 
"A. It is perfectly flat. 
"Q. Perfectly flat. And so you traveled 
from a position some approximately six feet 
back from the edge of the highway to a posi-
tion out to the center of the intersection without 
ever again looking again to the east. 
"A. That's right. 
'' Q. And as a matter of fact, when you 
did look to the east there was nothing you could 
do to avoid the accident. 
''A. He was too close to me then, coming 
too fast." (Tr. 68-70) 
These facts permit only the following conclusions: 
First, plaintiff was fully aware of all of the 
dangers and conditions at the intersection. 
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Second, when plaintiff stopped, he stopped too far 
back to properly observe west bound traffic on the 
Topaz highway; or, if he was far enough forward to 
observe the west bound traffic, he failed to see defend-
ants' car when it was openly visible and obvious. 
Third, he failed to look to the east until he was 
1n the middle of the Topaz highway, when it was 
too late to avoid the accident. 
Cons1dering these conclusions separately, it is ap-
parent that plaintiff failed to exercise that degree of 
care required of hin1 under the circumstances and 
established beyond any possibility of a question m 
reasonable minds that he was guilty of negligence as 
a matter of law. 
First, his testimony leaves no grounds for con-
trary argument or discussion that the dangers noted 
in the intersection existed and were recognized by 
him. He had traveled this road many times before, 
and was well acquainted with all the circumstances 
and physical factors. 
Second, plaintiff stopped his jeep before entering 
the intersection. The stark, unadorned facts com-
pelled him to stop, for he drove a green jeep with a 
brown top which blended with the sunflowers and 
weeds. He knew the ore trucks were traveling the 
Topaz highway, and he knew these trucks or anyone 
traveling the highway would have difficulty seeing 
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him in his jeep against the weeds and sunflowers. He 
knew he had been hidden from observation by west 
bound traffic as he approached the intersection be-
cause of the bank of soil on the east side of the rO'ad. 
From these circumstances and his testimony, it is 
obvious that he did not expect traffic on the Topaz 
highway to know he was approaching or going to 
cross, and he knew or should have known that west 
bound traffic had the right-of-way. And so Mr. Poul-
sen stopped, but he stopped with his front wheels 
some 3 feet south of the Topaz highway! There is 
no conflict in the evidence that the sunflowers and 
weeds grew densely to within about 2 feet of the 
Topaz highway. Nor is there any conflict that this 
placed ~Ir. Poulsen some 6 feet back from the highway 
as he sat in his jeep, and he so testified. No other 
conclusion can be placed upon such facts nor inference 
drawn than the inescapable conclusion that Mr. Poul-
sen's view of the Topaz highway to the east was 
obstructed by a 4 foot thicket of sunflowers and weeds 
some 7lf2 feet tall ! And, as he testified, he couldn't 
even see as well to the west. Plaintiff attempted to. 
counteract the devastating impact of his own testi-
mony regarding the physical facts by a purported 
measurement made subsequent to the accident and 
after the weeds had been cut down. He stated that£ 
from where he stopped he could see some 400 feet 
to the east on the Topaz highway. We submit that 
this is contradictory to his own previous testimony, 
and appears to be a physical impossibility. But even 
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so, this only serves as additional evidence of his 
negligence for at the same time he estimates his speed 
at the time of the impact to have been 10 miles per 
hour. (Tr. 60, R. 12) He is aware of the fact that 
according to his instant glance estimate of the speed 
of defendants' automobile, defendant would have been 
covering about 102 feet per second. (Tr. 58) It is 
respectfully submitted to this court that plaintiff went 
from a stopped position of zero miles per hour to 10 
miles per hour at point of impact, or an average speed of 
5 miles per hour representing a speed of 7.33 feet 
per second. The Topaz highway was 20 feet wide on 
the oiled surface, but plaintiff traveled the 3 feet to 
the oiled surface plus the 10 feet half way across, or 
a total of approximately 13 feet, before the impact. 
To travel the distance of 13 feet at 7.33 feet per 
second would take a fraction of a second less than 
2 seconds. Even discounting the fact that defendant, 
Wood, applied his brakes and thus decelerated his 
automobile prior to the crash, and admitting for the 
sake of argument only that defendant, Wood, was 
driving as fast as plaintiff claims, defendants' auto-
mobile could have been only 204 feet east of the inter-
section when plaintiff began his negligent crossing of 
the highway. If plaintiff could see 400 feet east on 
the road, a.s he says he could, he certainly failed to 
see what was there to be s·een. 
This court has clearly established the law govern-
ing such circumstances and held the plaintiff guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
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Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350; Hickok v. 
Skinner, ------Utah ______ , 190 P. 2d 514; Conklin v. Walsh, 
------ Utah ______ , 193 P. 2d 437; Gren v. Norton, ______ Utah 
______ , 213 P. 2d 356 ; 136 A.L.R. 1497. 
In the Bullock v. Luke case, supra , this court said : 
''The question may arise: When should 
Bullock have seen Luke to have avoided the 
characterization of being negligent~ In Blash-
field, Vol. 2, Permanent Edition, Cyclopedia of 
Automobile Law and Practice, page 230, § 1038, 
this statement is found: 
'There is no arbitrary rule as to the 
time and place of looking for vehicles on an 
intersecting road, and no particular distance 
from the intersection is prescribed for that 
purpose. The general standards are that 
observation should be made at the first 
opportunity and at a point where observa-
tion will be reasonably efficient for, and 
conduce to, protection. ' 
"We do not have to determine any given 
point. It is sufficient if under all the circum-
stances we can properly say that Bullock's 
failure to see Luke was, as a matter of law, 
negligence. ' ' 
As shown by plaintiff's testimony, plaintiff stopped 
his jeep at a point 4 feet back of the forward edge 
of the dense thicket of weeds taller than his jeep, and 
·certainly at a point where observation was not rea-
sonably efficient for, or conducive to, protection. 
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In the Hickok v. Skinner case, supra, this court 
also established the following rule of law: 
''While the facts in the case of Bullock v. 
Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350, are dissimilar, 
one of the rules laid- down by that case is applic-
able here; and that is, regardless of which driver 
is technically entitled to the right of way, both 
operators must use due care and caution in pro-
ceeding into and across intersections. While the 
burden to drive so carefully as always to be 
prepared for, and to be able to ·avoid, the 
negligence of another should not be placed on 
either driver, there should be placed on both 
the burden to keep a proper lookout and to use 
reasonable care to avoid a collision. Neither 
should be permitted to close his eyes to other 
vehicles which he knows or has reason to believe 
are approaching, simply because a state statute 
or municipal ordinance designates him the pre-
ferred driver. The rights of drivers approaching 
and crossing intersections are relative. Both 
drivers have the duties of being heedful and 
of maintaining a pr-oper lookout. Plaintiff was 
neglectful in both particulars, and no jury could 
reasonably find that he was not negligent. 
"Plaintiff in claiming that, having looked 
once and having concluded that he had time to 
clear the intersection, he was not negligent in 
not having looked again, overlooks two factors 
that we believe are of controlling influence in 
this case, and which affect the application of the 
rule of the Bullock case mentioned above. The 
first is, he was uninformed as to the speed of 
defendant's car. The second is that the speed 
at which plaintiff was travelling and the distance 
he had to travel, before he entered defendant's 
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path of travel, pern1itted him time to look and to 
reappraise the relative positions of the cars and 
pennitted him ample opportunity to correct his 
first conclusion, if he had erroneously estimated 
the distance the defendant's car was from the 
intersection.'' 
In the instant case, had plaintiff stopped at a 
point where observation was possible, he would have 
seen defendants' automobile. Also, he was stopped, 
thus giving him ample time to appraise the relative 
positions of the cars and to have remained where he 
was, and thus avoided the accident. 
In the Gren v. Norton case, supra, this court re-
iterated the rule that: 
"As we held in the Hickok v. Skinner case, 
supra, the fact that the statute gives a motorist 
a right-of-way into an intersection does not 
permit him to proceed across without observing 
the movement of other vehicles which may be 
moving into and across the intersection. 
* * * 
''In this particular instance deceased was 
traveling at a slow rate of speed, should have 
seen the truck approaching, and .could have 
stopped his car in a very short distance. He 
should not be charged with avoiding defendant's 
negligence but he is required to maintain a rea-
sonable lookout for his own safety.'' 
That plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
by his failure to observe what must have been there 
to be seen within the 400 feet east on the highway is 
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well established by this court 1n the cases of Mingus 
v. Olsson, ------ Utah ...... , 201 P. 2d 495, and Sant v. 
Miller, ------ Utah ______ , 206 P. 2d 719. 
In the Mingus case this court designated the law 
applicable to a situation where one fails to see and 
pay heed to what must be present to be seen: 
''More convincing than the direct testimony 
th!lt deceased did not look, is the further evi-
dence that deceased neither said nor did anything 
to indicate that he was at all aware of the 
danger presented by defendant's approaching 
automobile. He seems to have been wholly un-
aware of its approach. Certainly he did nothing 
either to warn his wife, nor to rescue either 
himself or her from their position of peril. On 
this evidence, it must be said as a matter of 
law that deceased either failed to look, or having 
looked, failed to see what he should have seen. 
"There can be no doubt that a pedestrian 
who undertakes to cross a busy street of a 
large city, without first observing for vehicular 
traffic is guilty of contributory negligence. And 
this is true, even though he may be crossing 
in a crosswalk, and have the right of way. In 
the recent case of Hickok v. Skinner, Utah, 190 
P. 2d 514, this court held that a motorist who 
had the right of way across an intersection, 
nevertheless had a duty to observe for traffic 
as he proceeded across the intersection. The 
rights of pedestrians to the use of the public 
streets are the same as those of motorists-
neither greater nor less. Hence, the same gen-
eral duties devolve upon them. A pedestrian 
·crossing a public street in a crosswalk or pedes-
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trian lane, although he may have the right of 
way over Yehicular traffic, nonetheless has the 
duty to observe for such traffic. Clearly deced-
ent neglected that duty in this case. It follows 
that he was contributorily negligent as a matter 
of law. Of course we do not mean to imply that 
a mere glance in the direction of the approach-
ing automobile would suffice. The duty to look 
has inherent in it the duty to see what is there 
to be seen, and to pay heed to it." 
In the Sant case this rule is reaffirmed: 
''A greater degree of care is necessary upon 
the part of a pedestrian who undertakes to cross 
a city street at a prohibited place than is placed 
on one who uses a marked crosswalk. And 
especially is this true, when because of darkness 
and climatic conditions, the opportunity for 
drivers to clearly discern the pre.sence of indi-
viduals on the roadway is greatly restricted. It 
is not due care for a person to observ~ what 
might be approaching danger when there is no 
necessity to look elsewhere.'' 
As hereinbefore stated, under the facts of the 
instant case, if plaintiff could in fact see some 400 feet 
to the east as he was stopped before entering the 
intersection, his failure to see defendants' ,automobile 
which must have been there to be seen, and to pay 
heed to it, constituted contributory negligence on his 
part so fundamental as to preclude any differing be-
tween reasonable minds. We have pointed out before 
that plaintiff was well aware of the dangers of the 
intersection because of the weeds, and a greater degree 
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of care rested upon him. He had no necessity to look 
elsewhere, and he should have observed what was an 
approaching danger. 
In Blashfield, Vol. 2, Permanent Edition, Cyclo-
pedia of Automobile Law and Practice, pages 237, 241, 
§ 1041, the law applicable to the instant case is given: 
"Where the view of an intersecting road 
by a motorist approaching it is obscured, he 
must use special caution in making such ap-
proach. 
* * * 
''The duty of keeping a vigilant out look 
in order to fulfill the obligation of the exercise 
of ordinary care, is especially applicable in a 
case involving an approach to an intersection 
along a road or street from which a view of the 
intersecting way is obstructed, and most emphati-
cally so where an automobile driver, approach-
ing a street intersection likely to be crossed at 
any time by other machines, is thoroughly ac-
quainted with the traffic conditions at that 
crossing, and knows of an obstruction on the 
cross street preventing drivers from seeing 
approaching automobiles on the street whereon 
he is travelling.'' 
The case of Delsman v. Bertotti, 93 P. 2d 371 
(Wash. 1939), is directly in point with the instant case. 
In that case, plaintiff was well aware of the dangerous 
condition of an intersection caused by a hedge which 
obscured his view, and although there was no stop 
sign, he stopped. But he stopped too far back to prop-
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erly observe defendant's truek, which was approaching 
from his right at an excessive rate of speed. In affirm-
ing the judgment dismissing the action with prejudice, 
the Supreme Court of 'Vashington said: 
''The trial court did not err in ruling that 
as matter of law appellant was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence which barred his recovery in 
this action. The northeast corner of the inter-
section was obstructed. Under the law, appellant 
was required to look out for and yield the right 
of way to, a vehicle approaching from his right. 
The observation which a driver in appellant's 
position is required to make is observation from 
a point at which he can see, and decide when 
he can proceed within a reasonable margin of 
safety, not from a point, back from the inter-
secting street, from which his view is seriously 
obstructed. Appellant, at a point approximately 
twelve feet east of the east curb line of Fifteenth 
avenue, undertook to start his car from a dead 
stop and proceed across that highway, without 
looking north along that street from the east 
curb line on Fifteenth avenue, from which point 
he would have had a clear view of approaching 
traffic, and would, of course, have seen respond-
ent's truck approaching from his right. 
''Appellant argues that under the rule laid 
down in the case of Martin v. Hadenfeldt, 157 
Wash. 563, 289 P. 533, he was deceived by the 
fact that the truck was moving at an excessive 
rate of speed. Appellant relies upon the Haden-
felt case, contending that the facts in the two 
cases are practically identical. In the case cited, 
the opinion calls attention to the fact that the 
disfavored driver looked to his right from the 
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curb line of the intersecting street, and saw 
approaching the car with which he subsequently 
collided. Under the peculiar circumstances of 
the case, this court held that whether or not the 
disfavored driver had acted in a reasonably 
prudent manner, in consideration of all the 
evidence, was for the jury to determine. The 
question to be determined involved .a car which 
the disfavored driver saw, not a car which he 
did not see, and the disfavored driver looked 
to his right from a point from which he could 
:see all approaching traffic. The last of the four 
elements of the rule laid down in the Hadenfeldt 
case does not .apply here, as appellant testified 
that he did not see respondent's truck until it 
was too late for him to stop to avoid the colli-
sion, and that if he had seen the truck from the 
east margin of Fifteenth avenue, as he must 
have seen it, had he looked, he would not have 
attempted to cross the intersection ahead of it.'' 
* * * 
''The burden to avoid colliding with a car 
approaching from his right rests heavily upon 
the disfavored driver. A clear and unambiguous 
statute imposes this burden, and the ingrafting 
of exceptions upon this sound and wholesome 
rule of the road would tend only to confusion, 
.and lead drivers occupying the disfavored posi-
tion under the statute to think that they might 
somehow escape the burden imposed upon them 
by law, and throw the blame for avoidable acci-
dents upon another. Speed is of much less im-
portance than safety, and under modern traffic 
conditions, safety, to a great extent, depends 
upon careful and prudent observation both of 
natural physical conditions and of other vehiclea 
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using the highway, as well as of pedestrians. 
'V e are in accord with the rules laid down in 
the Hadenfeldt case, but are not inclined to 
extend the exception therein provided for. 
"In the case at bar, appellant relied upon 
a somewhat restricted view of Fifteenth ave-
nue to his right. A perfectly clear and unob-
structed view ·was available to him after his 
car advanced only a few feet from where he 
took the observation upon which he relied. In 
failing to again look to his right, he was negli-
gent. He did not bear the burden which rested 
upon him as the disfavored driver, and the 
trial court properly so held." 
This case was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court 
of Washington in the case of Hefner v. Pattee, 96 P. 
2d 583 ('Vash. 1939). And the court said: 
''In the recent case of Delsman v. Bertotti, 
Wash., 93 P. 2d 371, 375, we affirmed a judg-
ment of the superior court dismissing an action 
for damages resulting from an intersection col-
lision, calling attention to the fact that the dis-
favored driver undertook to cross .an intersecting 
street without looking to his right from the 
curb line, from which point he would have had 
a clear view of approaching traffic, and would 
necessarily have seen the approaching vehicle, 
which had the right of way. Neither street was 
an arterial, but in view of the facts, that is 
not an important difference. In the course of 
the opinion, we used the following language : 
'In the case at bar, appellant relied upon a some-
what restricted view of Fifteenth avenue to his 
right. A perfectly clear and unobstructed view 
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was available to him after his car advanced 
only a few feet from where he took the observa-
tion upon which he relied. In failing to again 
look to his right, he was negligent. He did 
not bear the burden which rested upon him as 
the disfavored driver, and the trial court prop-
erly so held.''' 
Dembicer v. Pawtucket Cabinet & Builders Finish 
Co., Inc., 193 A. 622, 58 R. I. 451 (R. I. 1937), is an 
intersection collision case where an obstruction of clear 
vision existed. In affirming a directed verdict for the 
defendant, the court said: 
''The duty to exercise due care, that is, the care 
an ordinary prudent person would exercise under 
like circumstances, is therefore one which the 
driver of an automobile approaching a street 
intersection is particularly hound to observe. 
The degree of care required from such driver 
at any given time or place varies with the con-
ditions reasonably to be observed at an inter-
section and increases in proportion to the in-
creased danger reasonably to be apprehended. 
The greater the appreciable danger, the greater 
the degree of care necessary to constitute due 
or ordinary care. It is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to state a rule of general appli-
cation in intersection cases, unless we establish 
one by judicial fiat, which we are not disposed 
to do. The determination of what constitutes 
due care under the circumstances in any case 
must, therefore, depend upon the facts in that 
case. 
''The driver of an automobile intending to 
cross an intersection should not only observe 
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the so-called laws of the road, which include 
traffic regulations established by statutes or 
ordinances; but, before crossing, he should look 
when looking is efficient and take into con-
sideration the circumstances attending a~ the 
time, such as the physical conditions at the inter-
section, the weather, road and light conditions, 
the relative importance of the streets or high-
ways forming the intersection, the intensity and 
course of traffic, and the distance and speed of 
other vehicles that may be approaching that 
same intersection. The rule in our cases that 
one must look before entering and crossing an 
intersecting street requires that one look at a 
time and place when looking will seasonably 
apprise a reasonably careful person of the con-
ditions confronting him at the intersection, so 
that he may control his actions accordingly. The 
duty is not merely one of looking, but is one 
of observing the traffic and general situation 
at or in the vicinity of the intersection. He 
must look in the careful and efficient manner in 
which a man of ordinary prudence in like cir-
cumstances would look in order to ascertain 
the existing conditions for his guidance. 
"We know of no arbitrary rule, established 
by statute or by our decisions, as to the time 
and place of looking for vehicles on an intersect-
ing street, and no particular distance from the 
intersection is prescribed for that purpose. A 
person approaching the intersection should make 
the necessary observation at a time and place 
where observation, in the exercise of ordinary 
care, will be reasonably effective. For a further 
discussion of this subject, see Andrews v. Penna 
Charcoal Co., 55 R.I. 215, 221, 179 A. 696. '' 
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To the same effect is Mustin et al v. 'West et al., 
46 So. 2d 136 (La. 1950). Plaintiff proceeded into an 
intersection at which there were bushes and other ob-
structions so as to constitute the same a blind corner, 
and had reached and passed the center of the inter-
section when struck broadside by defendant's automobile 
entering the intersection from the plaintiff's right at 
an excessive rate of speed. In affirming the judgment 
rejecting plaintiffs' demands, the court said: 
"Since Mrs. Mustin was approaching a blind 
corner and a right-of-way street, it was her 
duty to proceed slowly and cautiously until her 
automobile had reached a point where there was 
no interference with her vision, and then she 
should have advanced into North Seventh Street 
only when the maneuver could be accomplished 
in safety." 
... * * 
''Circumstances similar to the case before 
us were involved in the accident under considera-
tion by the Orleans Court of Appeal in the case 
of Huerstel, et al. v. L. Mangano & Co., et al., 
39 So.2d 460, 462. We quote that Court's con-
clusion: '* * * our scrutiny of the record leads 
to the belief that the accident was caused through 
the joint negligence of Mrs. Huerstel, who failed 
to look and listen, and the driver of the truck, 
who operated his vehicle at an excessive }}ate 
of speed. Neither owner of the vehicles involved 
should be allowed to recover damages.' '' 
See also Epps v. Standard Supply & Hardware Co. 
et al., 4 So. 2d 790 (Ct. of App. La. 1942); Carey v. 
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DeRose, 282 NW 165 (:Mich. 1938); Smith v. Lamb, 
263 NW 311 (Iowa 1935). 
The third conclusion mentioned above is pointed 
out in the cases heretofore cited. Obviously plaintiff 
failed to see defendants' car at any time before plain-
tiff was in the middle of the highway and defendant, 
Wood, was some 40 or 50 feet away. Plaintiff tells us 
in his own words how the accident could have been 
avoided: 
'' Q. In sequence looking first to the east 
then west and back to the east, at what time in 
there did you start the vehicle o? 
''A. Well, I started forward; when I 
stopped I looked east and there wasn't anyone 
coming; I couldn't see very far west; I put 
the jeep in gear, drove the jeep ahead so I 
could see trucks to the west, trucks hauling 
ore from the west, they came quite fast travel-
ing along the road; I could see up the road, there 
was no trucks coming, and I looked east then 
I saw the car. 
"Q. By that time you were completely 
into the intersection 1 
''A. Yes. 
''Q. Completely over, upon the highway. 
''A. On the highway. 
'' Q. You had your jeep struck in the 
middle1 
''A. In the middle, yes, a trifle forward 
from the center. 
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'' Q. I understand your testimony, if you 
had waited a very short period of time no acci-
dent would have occurred. 
"A. No. If I hadn't stopped it wouldn't 
have occurred. ~ 
''Q. Qne of the two~ 
"A. Yes." (Tr. 57) 
This dilemma in which plaintiff found himself was 
one of his own manufacture and design. Providing 
he saw what was there to be seen, one glance to the 
east when he had reached a point where he could 
properly observe the highway to the east would have 
probably resulted in his waiting "a short period of 
time." To say that the accident wouldn't have hap-
pened ''if he hadn't stopped,'' can only mean ''if 
he hadn't stopped'' too far back to properly observe 
the highway when considered with the other alterna-
tive he proposes, for surely he is not assuming he 
could approach the intersection fully aware of and 
recognizing all of the physical dangers he enumerates 
and then blindly blunder across in total and complete 
disregard of the consequences. And yet, in the final 
analysis, this is exactly what he did do and he added 
to the disregard and blindness by stopping where he 
couldn't see, or failing to see what was there to be seen. 
It does not lie in plaintiff's mouth to claim or 
assert that if he had observed the automobile of de-
fendants just before he entered the intersection, he 
could have proceeded, considering it safe to enter, for 
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he testified that he established the speed of the auto-
mobile to be 70 miles per hour when he observed it 
right on top of him coming straight on and in just a 
flash. He also testified: 
"Q. Would you have any idea of the speed 
of an automobile if you were to observe it mov-
ing on the highway 1 
"A. Well, possibly would if the automo-
bile was traveling sideways· from me. When 
one is coming directly towards you it is hard to 
estimate the exact .speed, the only thing you 
could tell would be the approximate speed.'' 
(Tr. 16-17) 
Had plaintiff observed defendants' automobile coming 
sideways, he would have had an even more accurate 
judgment of the speed he assigns to the oncoming 
automobile. This court pointed out the negligence 
attributable to a plaintiff in such circumstances 1n 
Hickok v. Skinner, supra, when they said: 
"The fact that the plaintiff had the right of 
way over the defendant did not permit him, 
after having observed the defendant's car ap-
proaching the intersection, to thereafter com-
pletely ignore it, even though at the time he 
started he might reasonably have believed he 
had time in which to get safely across. While 
his attention may have been momentarily dis-
tracted by other traffic coming south on West 
Temple Street, such traffic was required to 
stop before entering the intersection and so would 
be travelling at a much slower speed than would 
the traffic moving along the arterial highway. 
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The evidence fails to establish a traffic situation 
which required the attention of a reasonably 
careful driver to be so restricted as to prevent 
him making a second observation to the east. 
The scope of plaintiff's vision would have per-
mitted him to have seen the automobile ap-
proaching without the necessity of turning his 
head completely around to the right. The time 
element, even if it were less than is shown by 
the evidence, was such that a reasonably prudent 
and careful person would have glanced to the 
east several times while traversing the distance 
from the stop sign to the point of collision. 
One look to the east before crossing the center 
line of 21st South Street would have disclosed 
to the plaintiff that he was about to enter the 
path of a rapidly moving vehicle, and that if 
he continued forward, a collision of the two 
vehicles would most likely occur. Furthermore, 
at the relatively slow speed plaintiff was travel-
ling, he could easily have made an immediate 
stop in time to have avoided the collision which 
did take place.'' 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence shows that defendant, Wood, was 
unacquainted with the intersection where the collision 
occurred; (Tr. 160) that he was on a straight, oiled 
surface highway and nothing existed to warn him of 
the intersection. The tall weeds by the .side of the 
highway and the embankment and weeds along the 
Sugarville-Hinckley road precluded any view of the 
approaching jeep. The green jeep blended well with 
the weeds and defendant, Wood, could not have seen 
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the jeep until he did under the circumstances. A rea-
sonably prudent person glances at the speedometer of 
his automobile occasionally, and no negligence can 
attach to \V ood for his doing so. The only competent 
evidence in the record established the speed of defend-
ants' automobile as not being excessive. The defend-
ants' motion for a non-suit should have been granted. 
The plaintiff was well acquainted with the inter-
section. He knew of the presence of weeds and of an 
embankment obstructing his vision to the east and 
northeast as he approached the intersection. He knew 
there was traffic on the Topaz highway. He was so 
well aware of the dangers incident to the high weeds 
at the intersection obstructing his view and that he 
was the disfavored driver as against any vehicle ap-
proaching from his right, that he stopped. But he 
stopped too far back to properly observe the traffic 
on the Topaz highway. He admits he stopped too far 
back as far as east bound traffic was concerned, and 
the facts are uncontradicted that he was behind a 
growth of weeds which must have prohibited him from 
observing the defendants' approach from the east. 
Further, by his own testimony, and at the speed he 
assigns to defendants' automobile, the automobile of 
the defendants must have been within the distance he 
maintains he could observe to the east. He then failed 
to look again to the east until he had reached the 
center of the intersection, when at the slow rate of 
speed he was traveling he could have stopped the 
jeep instantly according to his own words, (Tr. 58) 
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and one prior instant glance would have provided him 
with that opportunity and would have avoided the 
accident. He was guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law when he stopped where he stopped before entering 
the intersection. And when he looked to the east but 
failed to see what was there to be seen. And he was 
guilty of negligence when he failed to look to the east 
again until he was in the middle of the intersection. 
The plaintiff's answers to defendants' written inter-
rogatories, coupled with the opening address of his 
counsel to the jury, established the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff, and defendants' first motion 
for a directed verdict should have been granted. The 
testimony of plaintiff and of plaintiff's witnesses fur-
ther established this contributory negligence, and de-
fendants' motion for a non-suit at the close of plain-
tiff's evidence should have been granted. The evidence 
adduced in the entire trial conclusively proved the 
plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law, and defendants' second motion for a directed 
ver-dict or thereafter, defendants' motion for a new 
trial or defendants' motion for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict should have been granted. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
GRANT C. AADNESEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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